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ABSTRACT
An analysis is carried out in a sample of 738 industrial plants of the determining factors in the
use of internal promotion of blue-collar workers to middle managers and skilled technicians as
against their external recruitment. The use of internal promotion is positively correlated with
variables indicative of the efforts made by plants to measure employees' skills, and to a lesser
extent, with the level of specificity of investments in human capital made by blue-collar
workers. Contrary to what was expected, variables related with the use and efficiency of other
incentive systems have no significant influence on the increased or decreased use of internal
promotion. These results are initial evidence that internal promotions are used to protect and
favour specific investments, especially those made by firms in order to discover their workers'
skills.
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2INTRODUCTION
This study is an initial attempt to provide empirical evidence on the main factors
correlating with the use of internal promotion to a greater or lesser extent, as against the
external recruitment of workers. To this end, internal promotion policies of blue-collar
workers are analysed compared with external hiring of managers and skilled technicians
in a wide-ranging sample of plants representative of the Spanish manufacturing sector.
This involves focusing on one of the various types of promotion noted by Pergamit and
Veum (1999), which involves a change in assigning tasks to workers. It is this type that
has received most attention from a theoretical perspective, due to its possible
interference in the process of assigning individual skills to productive tasks (Baker et
al., 1988).
The use of internal promotion has been one of the basic premises of influential
economic models of the firm and their internal incentive systems, as well as
"tournament theory" (Lazear and Rosen, 1981), or career models in organisations
(Gibbons and Waldman, 1999). Various models have also offered theoretical
explanations for the use of internal promotion (Greenwald, 1979; Chan, 1996; Fairburn
and Malcomson, 2001) and its consequences (Prendergrast, 1993).
This theoretical development stands in contrast to the little empirical evidence available
(Pergamit and Veum, 1999, p. 82). In the economic field, most works have focused on
studying the factors determining the likelihood of a worker obtaining internal promotion
and the benefits of this for the worker. The evidence is taken from data from a particular
organisation (Baker et al., 1994; Asch and Warner, 2001; Treble et al., 2001), data from
a sample of the general population (McCue, 1996; Pergamit and Veum, 1999), a
combination of both (Abraham and Medoff, 1985) and data from a particular profession
(Spurr and Sueyoshi, 1994; Broder 1993). Although the external market’s influence and
importance is accepted (Pergamit and Veum observe approximately the same frequency
of internal promotions as inter-company job changes in the population analysed), the
type of data considered in these studies offers little scope for questioning the factors
affecting the fact that once the vacancy arises, firms use internal promotion instead of
external recruitment.
3In "management" literature, there are some studies that analyse the factors determining
the implantation of internal labour markets (e.g. Baron et al., 1986; Pfeffer and Cohen,
1984). In these studies, the presence of internal labour markets is measured by means of
many characteristics, with no clear theoretical justification for their interrelations apart
from the descriptive study by Doeringer and Piore (1971), with internal promotion
being one of the dimensions that make up internal labour markets. 
For this reason, a clear and isolated analysis of the determining factors in the use of
internal promotion would appear to be necessary in order to establish the reliability of
the assumptions made by the various theoretical models and the development of future
explanations of their use. The first section of this study therefore revises the main
theoretical arguments that have been used to analyse the use of internal promotion from
the economic point of view. This analysis leads to a series of predictions that will guide
the empirical work carried out. The test of these predictions is carried out using a
sample of 738 Spanish industrial plants, which are described in greater detail in the
second part of the study. The results of the empirical test of the hypothesis are presented
in the third section and the work ends with a discussion of the results obtained and the
final conclusions.
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROMOTIONS
The increasing and extensive application of economic models to the understanding of
various problems in human resource management has led some authors (Gibbons and
Waldman, 1999) to synthesise the main theoretical building blocks, upon which the
construction of models or guides to reasoning are built. In a similar way, we will also
use these theoretical building blocks for the analysis of the determinant factors in the
level of use of internal promotions by firms. Specifically, these building blocks are
productivity in hierarchical organisations (Rosen, 1982; Waldman, 1984a), human
capital (Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1974), imperfect information about skills (Spence, 1976;
Harris and Holmstrom, 1982) and effort (Harris and Raviv, 1979; Lazear and Rosen,
1981).
4Productivity in hierarchical organisations and human capital.
The first analyses of promotions (Rosen, 1982; Waldman, 1984a) were based on the
idea that the most talented workers are most productive if they are situated at the top of
the hierarchy, so workers will be allocated to job positions according to their talent and
their skills. This is an explanation of how people may recover their investment in
training and human capital, and therefore of the incentives that they have to make these
investments (Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1974). This implies finding a relationship between
the volume of investments in training and the hierarchical level occupied, something for
which empirical evidence already exists (Ortín-Angel and Salas-Fumás, 2002). In this
context, in which skills and knowledge can supposedly be observed, administrators of
human resources have only to assign workers to hierarchical levels. The worker's
previous work, whether or not she previously worked in the company or in the same
plant is irrelevant, providing that this has no effect on the type of knowledge or skills
that she has accumulated. The opportunity to develop knowledge specific to the
workplace was considered in the initial formulations of human capital theory (Becker,
1964), and subsequently studied and documented (Topel, 1991; Felli and Harris, 1996).
When specific knowledge is important for carrying out management work, an increased
use of internal promotion of workers as against external hiring is to be anticipated. By
covering the vacancy with someone who has already previously worked in the
organisation, a saving in training costs regarding specific aspects of the company
thereby occurs.
HYPOTHESIS 1: the probability of using internal promotion increases in those plants
where the level of specificity of the workers' knowledge is higher.
Existing empirical studies (Ortín-Ángel and Salas-Fumás, 2002), while showing a
strong relationship between peoples’ investments in training and the hierarchical levels
that they occupy in business organisations, clearly indicate that there is still an
important part of this assignment process that appears to respond to other motivations or
criteria.
The main theoretical suggestions come from analysis of information asymmetries, and
in particular, the difficulty of measuring or identifying workers' skills.
Difficulties in measuring skills
5Another of the theoretical building blocks with the greatest impact on economic
analysis of human resources is the one related to the learning process of workers' skills
(see, for example, a synthesis in Gibbons and Waldman (1999)). The main idea of these
models is that workers' skills are not easy for the company to observe, but may be
discovered over time. This has implications in that firms may make investments to
generate information regarding employees' skills or abilities. The reasons for carrying
out these investments may be highly diverse, such as improving efficiency when
assigning workers to hierarchical positions or avoiding information asymmetry
problems, as these mechanisms may be more efficient than implementing certain signal
systems (Spence, 1976). The difficulties with sharing this knowledge between firms are
obvious, because as some authors (Ricart i Costa, 1988; Waldman, 1984b; Bernhardt
and Scoones, 1993) have stressed, this knowledge may be used to their own benefit.
The information that firms possess regarding the skills of their own workers is more
precise than that available to them concerning other workers. For this reason, it should
be expected that if firms are averse to risk, they will have more confidence in internal
promotion systems than in systems for external recruitment (Greenwald, 1979).
HYPOTHESIS 2: the probability of using internal promotion increases in plants where
investment in measuring workers' skills is greatest.
The difficulty in measuring workers' skills means that to a greater or lesser extent, there
are also difficulties in measuring the effort they make in their job, which give rise to the
possibility of internal promotion also being used as an incentive system (Chan, 1996).
Promotions as incentive systems
Tournament theory (Lazear and Rosen, 1981) shows that promotions may be used as a
system to encourage workers' effort. The main focus for discussion is why the problem
of assigning people should be mixed with that of providing incentives, or in other terms,
whether or not there are other mechanisms that are more efficient than promotion to
elicit effort from employees (Baker et al., 1988). Various authors argue that the main
advantage of promotions is that they avoid employers from taking advantage of by not
providing the resulting rewards after having made an effort or investment in specific
human capital (Carmichael, 1983; Prendergast, 1993). They are also less susceptible to
6the possibility that middle management may give in to pressure from their subordinates
when implementing rewards (Fairburn and Malcomson, 2001). This is due to the fact
that the total amount of payments can be fixed initially, as well as the choice of one or
another worker for a specific hierarchical position have long-term consequences for
those taking promotion decisions. As a consequence, the increased use of tournaments,
i.e. internal promotion as an incentive system, is to be anticipated in those firms where
the employer's or manager's credibility is lowest in terms of respect for the conditions
established in the incentive systems, such as bonuses. Another positive aspect of
promotions is that because they are relative evaluations, they help to eliminate risks in
worker's wealth and obtaining information is less costly, as they do not require the exact
quantification of the individual result obtained (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). However, it
should also be remembered that as an incentive system, promotions have the
disadvantage of being an individual remuneration and therefore not well suited to
environments where collaboration between workers is necessary (Lazear, 1989). In
these situations, group incentives seem to be more efficient.
Hypothesis 3: the probability of using internal promotion decreases in those plants with
the most use and efficiency of other incentive systems.
The next sections deal with testing the hypotheses formulated. In Figure 1, the
relationships between these hypotheses are synthesised.
DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA
Sample
The information for carrying out this study was obtained within the framework of a
wider research project, focusing on the analysis of new work and production
organisation systems in Spanish manufacturing industry. The type of data is quite
similar to that used by Osterman (1994, 2000) for analysing the various aspects of
internal labour markets and work in North American firms.
FIGURE 1.Theoretical synthesis regarding determinants of internal promotions
H1: The probability of using internal
promotion increases in those plants where
the level of specificity of the workers'
knowledge is higher.
7The information was gathered between March and December 1997, using a
questionnaire directed to Spanish manufacturing plants with 50 or more workers. The
questionnaires were completed in personal interviews, in most cases with plant
directors, and operations and human resources managers. 965 valid interviews took
place, accounting for 16.04% of the total target group. Due to the fact that some
questionnaires were incomplete, the final number of observations used was 738, with all
sectors represented (see Table 1 for details). The information gathered refers basically
to the various human resource management policies applied to the blue-collar workers
in the plant where the interview took place, as well as the plant's practices in the area of
operations management. The lack of empirical studies on the subject clearly shows the
Productivity in
hierarchical organisations.
Human Capital
Theory. Skills
development.
Assignment of employees to
hierarchical levels based on
skills.
Problems of information on
managers’ skills
H2: The probability of using internal
promotion increases in plants where
investment in measuring workers' skills is
greatest.
Promotions can be used as
systems to encourage
managers’ efforts.
H3: The probability of using internal
promotion decreases in those
establishments with the greatest use and
efficiency of other incentive systems.
8difficulty in gathering information and directly observing most theoretical concepts
developed, such as the level of specificity, the information available regarding skills and
the use of incentives programmes. As was the case in previous studies of promotions
(Abraham and Medoff, 1985) and is usual in studies analysing various aspects of firms'
personnel policies, (Drago and Garvey, 1998, or Levine, 1993), these concepts were
measured using objective indicators and evaluations, on various scales, by the person
answering the survey. The variables used in this study are described below. More
detailed information on the survey and how it was obtained can be found in Bayo-
Moriones and Huerta-Arribas (2002).
Measuring variables
Internal promotion. This variable shows, on a five-level ordinal scale, the extent to
which the current middle managers and skilled technicians of the plant had previously
been blue-collar workers on the same premises. This variable takes a value of zero
when practically none of the middle managers and skilled technicians had previously
been blue-collar workers at the plant, one when they are a minority, two when they are
half, three when they are majority and the value of four is taken when practically all
were formerly blue-collar workers2 in the plant.
To test the hypotheses formulated in the theoretical section, we will use a series of
variables related to the three factors described as determinants in internal promotion -
specific knowledge (Hypothesis 1), knowledge measurement (Hypothesis 2) and the
efficiency of other incentive systems (Hypothesis 3).
Specific knowledge
As well as variables that can capture the general level of specificity, such as the
presence of permanent contracts, and given that various origins of specificity may
coexist (Williamson, 1983), we will develop various variables in order to capture
                                                          
2 Studies carried out at the Opel production plant in Figueruelas (Spain) show salary increases of 20%
upon promotion from operative to co-ordinator of a works team (Villanueva, 1997). These increases are
slightly above those noted by other studies of samples in North American companies (see Pergamit and
Veum, 1999).
9specificities related with location, locational specificity, and with technology,
continuous processes and technological change.
Permanent contracts. This is measured using the percentage of non-temporary workers
at the plant. The use of long-term contracts has been seen as a solution to problems
related to specific investments. For this reason, it should be anticipated that problems
with specific investments in knowledge are more important in those firms with a greater
percentage of non-temporary workers.
Locational specificity. This is a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 when there are
no other plants in the same economic sector in the area where the company is located. If
there is knowledge that is specific to the plant's industrial activity, the lack of similar
geographically close plants makes the threat of leaving the company more costly for the
worker.
Continuous processes. This variable is binary and shows whether the company
manufactures products in a continuous flow. Because continuous production implies
usually the manufacturing of a single product, it is to be expected that this favours
knowledge being more job-specific in comparison with processes organised around
projects.
Technological change. This variable shows whether there have been significant
technological changes at the plant in the last three years, on an ordinal scale of one to
five. A value of one means that there has been no change, while a value of five indicates
that the production system has completely changed. In sectors with the highest level of
technological changes, it is to be expected that the likelihood of some of the
technologies being exclusive to the company is higher, and that they therefore require
specific investments, or that a priori they are highly likely to be so (Pfeffer and Cohen,
1984).
Hypothesis 1 predicts a positive relation between the use of internal promotion and the
variables mentioned above.
Measuring skills
A series of variables related to environments in which the benefits of measuring skills
and knowledge are greater are identified in this section. The questionnaire included a
variable associated with plants in which non-observable characteristics are given
priority when choosing candidates for a job, a variable that captures the effort made by
10
the firms to measure blue collar workers' performance, extension of appraisal systems,
and a variable related to the competitive pressure which firms face to implement these
measuring efforts, degree of competition. All these variables are then defined in greater
detail.
Non-observable characteristics. In the questionnaire, a question concerning the factors
that are usually taken into account when initially selecting and hiring blue-collar
workers is included. The person interviewed had six alternatives to choose from -
experience, qualifications, age, ability to acquire new knowledge, personality and
ability to work in a team. When one of the three latter criteria was considered to be the
most important, the variable assumes the value of one, and if not, it takes the value of
zero. This variable is interpreted as an indicator of the benefits that may be gained by
the plant from the efforts made in measuring skills. If technical characteristics are the
most highly valued by production plants, this information regarding the qualifications
held by the candidate is easy to observe and would be enough for them to be selected,
meaning that internal and external candidates operate under the same conditions. In the
opposite case, it is to be anticipated that plants have more information available
concerning internal candidates.
Extension of appraisal systems. On an ordinal scale of one to five, this variable shows
how many of the blue-collar workers are evaluated in the work they carry out. It has a
value of one if none of the employees are evaluated and five if they all are. It is to be
anticipated that those firms where the evaluation systems include a higher number of
employees use internal promotion to a greater extent.
Degree of competition. This binary variable is equal to one when there are many
competitors in the market in which the company works. Degree of competition may
influence the need for increased control of the activities carried out in the company, and
therefore encourages the obtaining of information on workers by other means as well as
the use of formal evaluation systems, meaning that an increased use of internal
promotion is to be anticipated.
Hypothesis 2 predicts a positive relationship between the use of internal promotion and
the variables mentioned above.
The presence of alternative incentive systems
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Internal promotions make up a system of individual incentives, meaning that it is to be
anticipated that they are used to a lesser extent in plants where other incentive systems
are used, teamwork dominates and the intensity of supervision of workers is lower.
Incentives is a dichotomous variable showing whether or not incentive payment plans
exist. Where variable remuneration plans are implemented, it makes less sense to
establish additional motivation tools, such as promotions.
Teamwork is measured using the percentage of workers that carry out their work within
autonomous work teams. Organising work on the basis of teams hinders measurements
of individual performance, something which is necessary for the use promotions as a
means of rewarding those employees whose work merits it. It also requires continuous
cooperation between employees, something which contradicts the idea of individual
reward implied by promotions.
The intensity of supervision which employees undergo is measured by means of an
ordinal variable in five categories, where a value of one shows that the workers are not
supervised at all, and a value five shows that they are very intensely supervised at work.
In situations in which the company supervises its workers to a greater extent, there
would be less need to use motivation mechanisms such as internal promotions.
Hypothesis 3 predicts a negative relationship between the use of internal promotion and
the variables mentioned above. Figure 2 shows the synthesis of the expected
relationships between the use of internal promotion and all the explanatory variables
mentioned, in line with the three hypotheses mentioned in the theoretical section.
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FIGURE 2. Predictions for empirical testing of the determinant factors of internal
promotion.
THEORETICAL
CONCEPT
SIGN VARIABLES USED
Specific knowledge H1: + Permanent contracts
Locational specificity
Continuous processes 
Technological change
Skills measurement H2: + Non-observable characteristics
Appraisal systems
Degree of competition
Presence and efficiency of
other incentive systems
H3: - Incentives
Teamwork
Level of supervision
Control variables
There is a range of variables that may have an influence on the type of promotion used
in firms and which are not related to the hypotheses described above, such as the Size of
the plant (number of employees at the plant divided by 1000), which may have a
positive effect on the use of internal promotions. This is because in large plants, there is
a large number of positions to be covered and a higher number of candidates to choose
from (Pfeffer and Cohen, 1984).
In the sample used, internal promotion to middle manager only refers to those who were
previously blue-collar workers in the same plant. In fact, a distinction could be made
between promoting a worker from the same plant to a managerial position, promoting a
worker from another plant but the same company, and hiring workers with no links to
the company. This distinction is only relevant for firms with various production plants,
as is usually the case with multinational companies. To this end, we define a
dichotomous variable which assumes a value of one when the company is part of a
foreign Multinational group. In these companies, some external promotions may come
from blue-collar workers in the same company but from other plants being promoted,
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meaning that a lesser use of internal promotions of operatives from the same plant
should be anticipated3.
Other factors beyond the management's control, such as whether the company is in the
public sector or the influence of Unions, may also affect promotion decisions. As
suggested in the studies by Abraham and Medoff (1985) and Pfeffer and Cohen (1984),
union strength or public ownership of the company may encourage the management to
give into pressure by the workers to use internal promotions, as this facilitates access by
employees already working in the company to jobs with increased remuneration. The
influence of Unions is measured by an ordinal variable in five categories which assumes
a value of one when the influence of unions is very low and a value of five when this
influence is very high. Public ownership is reflected using a dichotomous variable.
Finally, a control is made using a variable linked to the labour market situation in the
area, unemployment. This variable is defined as the unemployment rate in the industry
and in the province in which the plant is located.
Table 2shows the average and the standard deviation of variables used, as well as their
correlation matrix. The data clearly shows that in the sample of industrial plants
available, internal promotion is used to a greater extent than external hiring (2.7 > 2, the
midpoint of the scale used). Interestingly, less than half of the plants, 36.5%, state that
they exclusively use a single system for covering vacancies, internal promotion or
external hiring, and most of the plants analysed alternate between both hiring systems.
The average plant size is 240 employees, of which 80% have stable employment
contracts. As far as ownership of the plants is concerned, 26% are part of multinational
companies and only 3% are publicly owned, with an average rate of union influence in
the plants and the average unemployment rate being 11.83%. The organisation of
production is characterised by little use of continuous production processes (19% of the
plants) and an average intensity of technological change. This is despite only 17% of
workers participating in work teams. 41% of plants say that they have many competitors
and only 5% state that there are no other plants in the same economic sector in the area.
As far as employment policies are concerned, 29% of the plants prioritise the non-
observable characteristics of candidates to become part of the plant's staff as operatives.
Once they have been employed, 66% of the plants use incentive plans to reward their
                                                          
3 We also carried out the analysis exclusively in those plants that do not belong to any multinational
14
operatives, with medium-high levels of supervision intensity, and on average, firms
evaluate the work of over half of their blue-collar workers. The hypotheses formulated
are tested below.
Testing the Hypotheses
Given that the variable relating to the use of internal promotion is ordinal, test of the
hypotheses set out above is carried out by estimating the ordered probit models
(Maddala, 1983).
Table 3 shows the results of the ordered probit estimations carried out. Five models
have been estimated. In the first of these, only the control variables have been included.
In the second, the variables related to the existence of specific knowledge have been
included as well as the control variables. In the third model, as well as the control
variables, there are the variables referring to knowledge measurement, while in the
fourth those relating to the presence and efficiency of other incentive systems appear.
The fifth and final estimation includes all the independent variables defined.
Of the five models, neither the first or fourth are globally significant. The ones
including knowledge specificity variables and their measurement are significant, as is
the final model.
The coefficients estimated in the final model, which are related to the hypotheses
defined, are quite similar to those estimated in previous models, meaning that no
important collinearity problems between the independent variables have been detected.
The comments focus on this last estimation.
The results clearly show that Hypothesis 2 is the one receiving the most support (1%
joint significance of all variables). Internal promotion is most frequently used in those
plants which have invested the most in measuring their workers' knowledge. The results
show that with significance levels below 5%, those plants using criteria that are more
closely related to non-observable characteristics in their new blue-collar workers
selection procedures are subsequently more likely to promote these same workers to
middle managers. It was also noted that the coefficient of the variable Appraisal systems
is significant and positive. The extension of the evaluation systems to a higher number
of workers in the company leads to an increased use of internal promotions. Finally,
                                                                                                                                                                         
group and the results did not substantially change.
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competitive pressure leads to an increased use of internal promotion. The coefficients
associated with the variable degree of competition are positive and significantly
different from zero at significant levels below 5%.
Hypothesis 1, in which internal promotion is favoured in those plants in which blue-
collar workers have made greater specific investments, is also corroborated in the
estimator models, although to a lesser extent than the previous hypothesis (5% of joint
significance in all variables). Of the group of variables aimed at including the
specificity of knowledge used by employees at the plants, all appear with the expected
sign and three are significantly different from zero. In the case of permanent contracts,
the results confirm what was expected, as the use of internal promotion is significantly
greater (around 5% significance) in those plants with the highest percentage of workers
with a permanent employment contract. Technological change positively (around 5%
significance) affects the degree of use of internal promotions as against external hiring,
and an effect of locational specificity is noted (only significant at levels of 10%) in
management itself. However, whether or not the plant's manufacturing process is
continuous was found to have no significant effect of any kind.
Hypothesis 3, relating to the use of internal promotions as incentive system, receives
hardly any support. None of the variables relating to the provision of incentives was
significant in the models estimated. Despite the sign of the coefficients associated with
the variables Teamwork and Supervision being those anticipated by the theoretical
models, neither of them, nor the one associated with the existence of incentives plans, is
significantly different from zero.
Of the control variables, only the Multinational coefficient is significant, and has a
negative sign. The data clearly shows that it is important to control for the presence of
this type of company. As mentioned above, those promotions affecting blue-collar
workers in the same company but from different plants are not considered to be internal
promotions. The other control variables do not appear to be significant in any of the
models estimated. It can be deduced from this that in the sample analysed, the size of
the plant, whether or not it is publicly owned, the influence of unions at the plant and
the level of unemployment in the area and industry have no effect on the increased use
of internal promotion.
The influence of industrial sectors
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Some of the variables analysed may be heavily influenced by the industrial sector in
which the plants develop their main activities. Because of this, it is advisable to
consider whether the plants have full discretion when establishing their promotion
policies, or whether these are determined by the characteristics of the industrial sector
in which the plant does its business. To this end, in model 4 estimated above, dummy
variables have been introduced with regard to the various sectors described in Table 1,
with the sector of Various manufacturing industries being omitted in order to avoid
problems of perfect collinearity. The results obtained are shown in Table 4.
The group of variables referring to industrial sectors is significant, at the level of 5%.
Once the remaining variables have been controlled for, the various manufacturing
industries sector is the one in which the greatest use of internal promotion takes place.
There is then a group of industrial sectors (the textile industry, dressmaking, leather and
footwear; wood and cork: paper, publishing and graphic arts; metallurgy and
mechanical product manufacture; transport material) in which this type of promotion is
used to a lesser extent, but the differences with the above are not statistically
significant. Differences with the omitted sector of around 5% significance are obtained
in the industrial sectors of Food, drinks and tobacco; the Chemical industry; Rubber and
plastic materials; Machinery and mechanical equipment; and Electric, electronic and
optical material and equipment. Finally, the Non-metallic mineral products sector is the
one that presents the least use of internal promotion, with a coefficient significance of
around 1%.
These results clearly show that the other variables maintain coefficients and
significance levels similar to those mentioned above. The main relationships shown in
the above section explain the intra-industry variation in the use of internal promotions4,
with the exception of locational specificity, which is only now significant at levels of
15%.
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
                                                          
4 The increase in the likelihood function logarithm that takes place when the variables referring to the
three hypotheses are added to a model in which only the control variables were included (model 1) and
the industry variables, is significant at levels lower than 1%.
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Most plants combine policies of internal promotion and external hiring to cover
vacancies of managers and skilled technicians. The low explanatory capacity of the
models analysed is an indication that these practices are not implemented systematically
together with the other practices analysed, unlike what was supposed in previous studies
on internal labour markets, such as those by Baron et al. (1986) and Pfeffer and Cohen
(1984). Despite this, it was noted that specific investments, and in particular
investments made by firms to discover their employees' skills, are the main explanatory
factors in the use of internal promotions in the sample of plants analysed in this study.
According to learning models (Gibbons and Waldman, 1999), plants lack perfect
information about the skills that their workers have for carrying out the activities
pertaining to the posts that they occupy. Learning about these skills can take place by
means of more or less formal evaluation processes (see for example Milbourn et al.,
2001). The importance of non-objective criteria in the initial hiring of blue-collar
workers has been interpreted as an indicator of the existence of less formal evaluation
processes. The results show that the use of internal promotion is greater in those plants
where formal and informal evaluation processes are more widespread. It can therefore
be seen that the employee evaluation systems in the various phases of their relationship
with the company are seen to be complementary to the use of internal promotions by
firms to cover vacancies arising in the organisation.
It should also be pointed out that despite what has been suggested in other studies on
the implementation of internal labour markets (Baron et al., 1986), in the sample
analysed it was noted that competition favours internal promotion policies. Our
interpretation of this phenomenon is that competition leads to increased supervision of
blue collar workers' activities and indirectly stimulates and facilitates the processes of
learning and formal (some positive correlation with the spread of evaluation systems
can be seen) and informal evaluation (although the correlation above the estimated
coefficient continues to be positive and significant), and as a consequence, increased
use of internal promotion.
All these results are consistent with the proposals by Greenwald (1979), employers will
tend to use internal promotion systems more when the difference in information that
they have concerning the worker compared to that which they have on other firms’
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workers is greater. These results are consistent with the assumptions of studies in which
it is assumed that there are differences of information between firms regarding their
workers' skills (Waldman, 1984b; Ricart i Costa, 1988; Bernhardt and Scoones, 1993).
In this respect, it is important from both a theoretical and empirical point of view to
extend this line of research in order to analyse the strategic behaviour of the firms with
better information about their employees than other firms.
The specificity of workers' knowledge or skills, with various variables used for
measurement, has also been seen to be a relevant factor in the use of internal labour
markets by other authors (Baron et al. 1986; Pfeffer and Cohen 1984). Although they
are apparently less significant than informational problems, the results shown confirm
that specific investments have a significant influence on the use of internal promotions.
The presence of technological change is especially relevant, beyond the specificities
arising from the location of the plant. These results may be important for those firms
who wish to encourage innovation, as they will need to develop a series of tools to
guarantee workers that they are going to recuperate the specific investments that they
make, and one of these is internal promotions. However, the significant influence of
permanent contracts on the use of internal promotion leads internal promotion to be
considered as a system to take advantage of specific investments that have already been
made rather than as a mechanism for protecting new investments of those workers
promoted.
Despite what was expected, the use of internal promotion is hardly influenced by the
presence of alternative incentive systems. A possible reason could be that the incentive
system is determined in combination with promotion decisions, meaning that the factors
favouring internal promotion also affect incentives. Econometrically, we should observe
that the incentive variables are significant in isolation, and lose significance when the
other explanatory variables are added. The results obtained show no collinearity
problems, meaning that the explanation above is to be rejected. This raises doubts
regarding the use of internal promotions as incentive systems for efforts, as suggested in
tournament theory (Lazear and Rosen, 1981), and existing prior evidence, where
incentives are seen to be sensitive to opportunities for workers' promotion (Garen, 1995;
Gibbs, 1994). Pergamit and Veum (1999) show that 30% of internal promotions do not
involve changes in the tasks of the promoted employees. This can be interpreted as the
19
firms using tournament systems as incentive mechanisms, but trying to dissociate the
assignment processes of individuals to hierarchical levels as far as possible. This would
explain incentives having little interference in the process for covering vacancies
together with the fact that the tournament is characterised not only by the probability of
promotion, but also by the rewards, which is possibly the variable that firms adjust.
As far as control variables are concerned, union presence and public ownership of
plants do not appear to have a significant influence on either means of covering
vacancies. These results are consistent with those obtained by Abraham and Medoff
(1985) and Pfeffer and Cohen (1984), in which managers' discretion is in practice much
greater than the restrictions that unions and public ownership of plants theoretically
appear to impose. Neither does the situation of the labour market, in terms of
unemployment, seem to have a significant effect on this decision. Pfeffer and Cohen
(1984) do not detect any relationship between recruitment difficulties and analysis of
the implementation of internal labour markets. Other control variables have been used
to overcome the limitations in the database. For example, the dependent variable used
refers to promotion within a single plant, with promotion from other plants in the same
company taken to be external promotion. This justifies the use of belonging to a
multinational group as an independent variable and may explain the results obtained in
our study with regard to the fact that multinational companies use internal promotion
systems to a lesser extent. It is to be expected that future research will be able to use
samples with more precise information (individualised information concerning each
promotion, identification and characteristics of the people promoted, etc.) and that they
will be able to expand on the initial results described here. One possible path is opened
up by the results obtained when the variables referring to industry are used.
Except in the case of locational specificity, the effects mentioned for the other variables
are maintained even in plants belonging to the same industry. Although promotion and
hiring policies seem to be established basically at plant level, the industrial sector in
which the company is located seems to have an influence on these decisions. The
sectors in which most internal promotion takes place seem to be those where the skill
level of blue-collar workers is lowest. Future studies could confirm this or suggest other
alternative explanations.
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CONCLUSIONS
This study, like any other empirical work, is limited, among other factors, by the
limitations of the database used. More extensive samples, with more information on
plants, various hierarchical positions and more precise measuring of the variables are
desirable and will certainly take place in the near future. However, in comparison with
the studies carried out to date, we believe that this article is a significant breakthrough
as it analyses the factors determining the choice of internal promotion versus external
recruitment of workers when covering vacant positions in firms, in isolation from other
characteristics of internal labour markets, for the first time.
The results show that most plants do not implement strict policies of internal promotion
or external hiring, but instead combine both types of procedure when covering
vacancies. However, there is a series of factors, which are mainly related to the
presence of specific investments by firms, which affect the implementation of either
hiring system. Investments made in discovering workers' skills in firms are particularly
important, and are difficult to observe in studies comparing workers who have obtained
internal promotion and those who have not. In this context, the importance of problems
of information about workers' skills and the efforts made to solve them seem to be the
main features in the process of determining the type of promotion chosen. We must also
point out that we did not find that the intensity or use of other incentive systems has an
influence on the decision to use internal promotion systems. These results provide
evidence that it is important not to make suppositions concerning which elements make
up a system such as internal labour markets, and therefore that it is necessary to analyse
the determinants of each of the elements both independently and in detail.
All the above should be interpreted with caution, as it deals with initial evidence that
must be expanded to other contexts different from the one analysed here, which it is the
promotion of plants operatives to positions of management or skilled technicians in
Spanish industrial plants.
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Table 1. Weight of the different industrial sectors.
CNAE Code Sector % Plants
15, 16 Food, drink and tobacco 14.09
17-19 Textile industry, dressmaking, leather and footwear 12.87
20 Wood and cork 3.52
21-22 Paper, publishing and graphic arts 6.10
24 Chemical industry 7.32
25 Rubber and plastic materials 5.56
26 Non-metallic mineral products 6.37
27, 28 Metallurgy and mechanical product manufacture 13.55
29 Machinery and metal equipment 7.59
30-33 Electric, electronic and optical material and equipment 7.72
34, 35 Transport material 9.89
36, 37 Various manufacturing industries 5.42
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the variables (N=738)
Average D.t. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1. Internal promotion 2.70 1.21
2. Size 0.24 0.56 -0.01
3. Multinational 0.26 0.44 -0.06* 0.21***
4. Public 0.03 0.17 0.01 0.05 -0.08**
5. Unions 2.57 1.23 0 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.09**
6. Unemployment 11.83 3.61 -0.02 -0.03 -0.10*** 0.01 0.03
7. Permanent  contracts 79.57 21.10 0.04 0.07** 0.18*** 0.09*** 0.11*** -0.17***
8. Technological change 2.69 1.16 0.06* 0.04 0.12*** 0.05 0.08** 0.02 -0.01
9. Locational specificity 0.05 0.22 0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.10*** -0.07* -0.11*** 0.03 0
10. Continuous processes 0.19 0.39 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.08** 0.07** -0.05 0 -0.04
11. Non-observable characteristics 0.29 0.45 0.08** 0.03 0.05 -0.05 -0.09*** -0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.09** -0.04
12. Appraisal system 3.94 1.18 0.08** -0.01 0.03 -0.06** -0.07* 0.04 -0.08** 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.04
13. Degree of competition 0.41 0.49 0.08** -0.07* -0.05 -0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.08** 0.03 -0.07** 0.03 0.03 0.04
14. Incentives 0.66 0.47 0.04 0.03 -0.04 -0.03 0.11*** 0.03 -0.03 0.07** -0.03 0 -0.03 0.07** -0.03
15. Teamwork 17.29 28.93 0 0.03 0.11*** 0.01 0.05 0 0.01 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0 -0.03 -0.03 0.04
16. Control 3.33 0.69 -0.01 0.05 0.01 -0.04 0 -0.07** -0.07** 0.15*** -0.05 0.05 -0.01 0.19*** 0.01 0.05 0
* p<0.1. **p<0.05. ***p<0.01
26
Table 3. Results of ordered probit model estimations
(t-statistic in brackets)
Control
variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 1.7130***
(10.214)
1.2152***
(5.237)
1.2632***
(5.607)
1.7632***
(7.081)
0.8978***
(2.714)
Size -0.0193
(-0.241)
-0.0208
(-0.254)
-0.0146
(-0.185)
-0.0196
(-0.240)
-0.0120
(-0.148)
Multinational -0.1724*
(-1.790)
-0.2244**
(-2.295)
-0.1902**
(-1.986)
-0.1641*
(-1.694)
-0.2384**
(-2.424)
Public 0.0059
(0.020)
-0.1289
(-0.460)
0.0829
(0.277)
0.0163
(0.056)
-0.0504
(-0.176)
Unions 0.0037
(0.111)
-0.0026
(-0.077)
0.0137
(0.410)
-0.0010
(-0.032)
0.0014
(-0.041)
Unemployment -0.0112
(-1.027)
-0.0077
(-0.697)
-0.0122
(-1.120)
-0.0116
(-1.056)
-0.0091
(-0.818)
Permanent  contracts 0.0031*
(1.710)
0.0036*
(1.897)
Technological change 0.0806**
(2.432)
0.0789**
(2.328)
Locational specificity 0.3312*
(1.789)
0.3148*
(1.678)
Continuous processes 0.0716
(0.716)
0.0742
(0.742)
Non-observable
characteristics
0.2168**
(2.471)
0.2041**
(2.301)
Appraisal system 0.0804**
(2.459)
0.0850**
(2.492)
Degree of
competition
0.1870**
(2.320)
0.2047**
(2.485)
Incentives 0.1012
(1.206)
0.0942
(1.108)
Teamwork -0.0002
(-0.156)
-0.0000
(-0.005)
Control -0.0290
(-0.535)
-0.0681
(-1.166)
µ1 0.7070***
(10.799)
0.7106***
(10.568)
0.7099***
(10.811)
0.7089***
(10.740)
0.7162***
(10.519)
µ2 1.1073***
(15.268)
1.1120***
(15.011)
1.1170***
(15.402)
1.1096***
(15.148)
1.1251***
(15.006)
µ3 2.0599***
(25.206)
2.0735***
(24.835)
2.0865***
(25.563)
2.0629***
(25.024)
2.1047***
(24.934)
Log L -1063.329 -1057.695 -1054.180 -1062.506 -1047.351
Global Chi-2 4.586 15.855* 22.855*** 6.232 36.543***
Chi-2 versus control
variables model
- 11.268** 18.298*** 1.646 31.956***
Not 738 738 738 738 738
* p<0.1. **p<0.05. ***p<0.01
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Table 4. Results of the estimation including the manufacturing sector variables 
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Constant 1.2407***
(3.142)
Food, drink and tobacco -0.5022**
(-2.282)
Size -0.0309
(-0.369)
Textile industry, dressmaking, leather
and footwear
-0.2802
(-1.279)
Multinational -0.1798*
(-1.738)
Wood and cork -0.2228
(-0.680)
Public -0.0393
(-0.140)
Paper, publishing and graphic arts -0.0030
(-0.012)
Unions 0.0115
(-0.326)
Chemical industry -0.5572**
(-2.207)
Unemployment -0.0100
(-0.860)
Rubber and plastic materials -0.4487*
(-1.819)
Permanent  contracts 0.0043**
(2.232)
Non-metallic mineral products -0.7460***
(-2.942)
Technological change 0.0763**
(2.144)
Metallurgy and mechanical product
manufacture
-0.2970
(-1.330)
Locational specificity 0.2782*
(1.441)
Machinery and metal equipment -0.5358**
(-2.055)
Continuous processes 0.0952
(0.919)
Electric, electronic and optical material
and equipment
-0.5916**
(-2.305)
Non-observable
characteristics
0.2149**
(2.383)
Transport material -0.3223
(-1.381)
Appraisal system 0.0824**
(2.401)
Degree of
competition
0.2310***
(2.748)
Incentives 0.0838
(0.952)
Teamwork 0.0007
(0.530)
Control -0.0741
(-1.242)
µ1 0.7273***
(10.314)
µ2 1.1409***
(14.639)
µ3 2.1365***
(24.341)
Log L -1036.112
Global Chi-2 54.019***
Chi-2 & model 4 22.478**
N 738
* p<0.1. **p<0.05. ***p<0.01
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